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ABSTRACT
While the short-run financial status of Social Security is secure, its
long-run financial status is very uncertain. The retirement and disability
part of the system (OASDI) is projected to be in long-run actuarial deficit
under the Social Security Administration's intermediate economic and
demographic forecasts. Hospital Insurance (HI) is projected to run a large
deficit, beginning in the 1990s. OASDI is projected to accrue a very large
surplus over the next thirty years, peaking at almost 30% of CNP. Social
Security has never accrued a surplus this large; it may well be dissipated
for other purposes, such as to bail out HI, fund other programs, raise
benefits, or cut taxes. These alternatives may affect net national saving,
directly because Social Security surpluses or deficits are part of
government sector saving and indirectly through effects on private saving
or the non-Social Security part of the federal government budget.
This paper documents how various systematic deviations from, or return
to, pay-as-you-go finance of the Social Security system may affect net
national saving. For example, under base case assumptions with respect to
the non-Social Security deficit, a constant net private saving rate of 6%,
and long-run budget balance in the state and local government sector, the
Social Security deficit offsets 40% of other net national saving over the
Social Security Administration's 75-year projection period. In the first
25-year sub-period, the Social Security surplus adds one-sixth to other net
national saving; in the second, it offsets almost one-half; and in the
third, it offsets five-sixths of other net national saving.
Of course, private saving may respond to changes in Social Security's
funding as may the non-Social Security balance in the federal budget. The
paper presents several alternative scenarios such as benefits increasing or
taxes falling during the OASDI surplus period, various stylized rules
concerning the non-Social Security budget deficit, and separate balancing
of HI via outlay reductions or tax increases. The results indicate that
OASDI may effect net national saving substantially. For example, if
benefits ratchet up during what would have been the period of the OASDI
surplus, the OASDI system may subsequently offset virtually all of
remaining net national saving. On the other hand, if HI is brought into
balance and the OASDI surplus is allowed to accrue, Social Security will
offset only about 4% of other net national saving.
Changes in private saving may accentuate or ameliorate the swings in
the net national saving rate generated by the future financing of OASDHI,
but the alternative financing options will be important determinant of net
national saving, and therefore of private domestic investment and
international capital flows.
Michael J. Boskin
NBER, 204 Junipero Serra Blvd.
Stanford, CA 94305
(415) 326-71601. Introduction
While the short-run financial status of Social Security is quite
secure, its long-run financial status is very uncertain. First, future
economic and demographic trends will heavily affect revenues andoutlays.
Second, except under the Social Security Administration's optimistic
economic and demographic scenario, the retirement and disabilitypart of
the system (OASDI) is projected to be in long-run actuarial deficit: small
under the intermediate assumptions; large under pessimistic ones.
Hospital Insurance (HI) is projected to run a large deficit beginning in
the l990s. Finally, the OASDI system is projected to accrue (under the
intermediate assumptions) a very large surplus over the next thirtyyears.
This surplus is projected to cumulate to almost 30% of GNP, close to the
current national debt to GNP ratio. This surplus is "designed" to reduce
the need for still larger tax increases or benefit reductionsduring the
baby boom generation's retirement. Figure 1 presents estimates of these
average annual (not cumulative) surpluses and deficits in Social Security,
including and excluding HI, over the next 75 years to highlight this
projected movement away from pay-as-you-go finance.
We have never been able to accrue a surplus this large in Social
Security; the retirement surplus may well be dissipated for other purposes
(to bail out HI, fund other programs, raise benefits, cut taxes, etc.).
These possibilities involve major inter-cohort transfers relative to
accruing the surplus, as do, of course, the alternative methods of dealing
with the long-run deficit (see Boskin (1986)). They also involve
potentially major effects on net national saving in the United States,
directly because of the role Social Security surpluses or deficits will
play in government sector saving or borrowing and indirectly via whatever
effects they have on private saving or the non-Social Security part of the
1federal government budget.
The purpose of this paper is to present calculations of the financial
status of Social Security and its impact on net national saving under
alternative economic, demographic, and future financing assumptions.
Thus, the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes our
methodology and data, and briefly discusses related analyses. Section 3
presents estimates under alternative economic and demographic assumptions
of the long-run actuarial status of OASI. They indicate how the long-run
financial status may vary from very large surpluses to very large deficits.
Section 4 estimates the implications of alternative uses of the large
surplus which is projected to accrue in OASI's trust fund: what difference
it makes in the aggregate if the surplus is used to raise benefits or
reduce taxes, or is spent on other programs.
Section 5 turns to the potential implications of these alternative
scenarios for the level and time pattern of net national saving. The
status of the Social Security system may affect the net national saving
rate in several ways. First, the surplus (or deficit) in any year
contributes directly to that year's net government saving (or dissaving).
Second, a Social Security surplus or deficit may affect the surplus or
deficit in the remainder of the federal government budget. Third, the
status of Social Security may affect private saving. This paper
concentrates on the first two avenues through which Social Security affects
national saving. While I believe the weight of the evidence is that Social
Security's expected evolution will affect private saving as well, this
effect is somewhat more controversial and its magnitude subject to much
dispute (while much important work has been done since then, the classic
debate on the subject remains Barro and Feldstein (1978)). Thus, the
2results reported in this paper should be considered a large part of, but
not the entire, story. The results are striking: alternative scenarios
with respect to accruing or dissipating the surplus have major effects on
the net national saving rate. Under the Social Security Administration's
intermediate assumptions, Social Security's long-term deficit (including
HI) offsets almost 40% of the remaining net national saving. The time
pattern is equally interesting: a surplus adding one-sixth to net national
saving in the 1986-2010 period, but a deficit offsetting one-half of all
other net national saving in 2011-2035 and five-sixths in 2036-2060. With
tax increases and/or outlay reductions to cover the HI deficit, the surplus
adds one quarter to net national saving in the 1986-2010 period.
Section 6 discusses some of the implications of these results for
investment, international capital flows, trade, and productivity growth.
Section 7 presents a brief conclusion which offers a short summary and
repeats some caveats concerning interpretation of the results.
2.Data, Method, and Cursory Literature Review
Several studies analyze the long-run financial solvency of Social
Security under alternative economic and demographic assumptions. The
most important, of course, are the annual Social Security trustees'
reports (formally, the Annual Reports cf the Board of Trustees of the
Old Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds).
They present both short-and long-terni actuarial projections of Social
Security trust fund finances under alternative assumptions. The reports
certainly have valuable information, but these data are presented only
as fractions of taxable payroll (except, in one table, as fractions of
GNP); dollar figures (whether discounted or not) are not presented for
long-term projections. More importantly, the reports do not in fact
3consider what the state of the retirement (OASI) trust fund might be at
the end of the report's 75 year horizon. Rather, it presents the simple
average, over 75 years, of each year's surplus or deficit (that is, tax
receipts minus benefit payments) as a fraction of that year's taxable
payroll. The calculation considers neither the increase over time in
taxable payroll nor the interest earned on the cumulated trust fund
surplus. Thus, the 1986 report's claim that the OASI trust fund is in
"close actuarial balance" because the average annual deficit is only
0.29 percent of taxable payroll is based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of what that figure means. The report presents no
sufficient basis for evaluating the long-run financial solvency of Old
Age and Survivors Insurance.1
Boskin's (1986) estimates of the long-run financial solvency of OASI
avoid these inadequacies by considering annual flows of dollars and by
projecting the actual accumulation and decumulation of the OASI trust fund.
He also considers what will happen if the expected cumulative surplus of
the next three decades is dissipated (for example, by raising benefits) or
if reforms are instituted in retirement age and other features.
The results presented here are based partly on computer simulations of
present and future families covered by the Social Security system, and
1. In fact, if the report were to present the correct calculation, based on
the report's own assumptions and methodology, the resulting figures would
be more optimistic under each of the four sets of assumptions used. A
comparison of Tables 10 and F2 in the 1986 report shows that taxable
payroll is projected to rise at a rate slightly below the assumed interest
rate (under each alternative set of assumptions). This means that the
earlier positive annual balances should be given greater weight than the
later negative annual balances. Thus, the long-run actuarial balance
should be reported as a little higher.
4partly on the SSA projections discussed above. Our main simulation derives
figures for annual income to and expenditure from the Social Security
Administration's retirement (that is, OASI) trust fund over the next 75
2
years.
This simulation begins with earnings records and other dataconcerning
Social Security participants who were surveyed in l973. For
subsequent years we estimate participants' earnings based on demographic
characteristics, we derive benefits based on legislated benefit formulae,
and we determine each participant's year of death through a randomprocess
based on mortality tables published by the Social Security
Administration.4
Cohorts born beginning in 1953 are simulated differently. In
considering typical male and female wage earners born each year, we derive
their expected tax and benefit futures based on mortalityprobabilities and
the proportion that can be expected tomarry. We multiply by the number
born each year (plus the number born thatyear who later immigrate as
children) who will enter covered employment and thus derive figures for
entire cohorts. To derive income and expenditure for the trust fundas a
whole we make a further adjustment for taxes paid and benefits receivedby
adult immigrants.
2. For further information on this simulation, or rather on an earlier version
of it, see Boskin, Avrin, and Cone (1983).
3. The 1975 Social Security Exact Match File merged individual records from
the 1973 Current Population Survey with records of coveredearnings.
4. Social Security Administration, Actuarial Study No. 92 (1984).
5The discussion is based on a version of our simulation which assumes
the tax law effective at the time of the Trustees' Report. Results
presented below use the recently enacted income-tax law.5
In the main simulation we rely on Social Security Administration
projections for the proportion of Social Security benefits which are
recovered for the trust fund through income taxation. These estimates are
that this proportion will rise from less than two percent in 1986 to about
five percent in the mid-twenty-first century. Because legislated marginal
tax rates have been reduced since the Social Security Administration made
its projections we assume that, from 1988 on, 20 percent less will be
collected in taxes on benefits. In 1987, the transition year, we assume
that 10 percent less will be collected.
This simulation is paraineterized by economic, demographic, and legal
assumptions. The most important economic assumption is future growth of
real wages. The chief demographic assumptions are mortality probabilities
by age and fertility rates. The legal assumptions are payroll tax rates
and formulae for the calculation of benefits. In the scenarios below we
consider the alternative economic and demographic assumptions that the
Social Security Administration itself uses for the scenarios in its annual
5. Our calculation is certainly rougher than that undertaken by the actuarial
staff of the Social Security Administration. As a result, we generate
projections of aggregate taxes and benefits which vary from those of the
1986 Trustee's Report. Between now and 2010 we derive less in annual and
cumulative surpluses (due to deriving less in tax receipts) than what the
Trustee's Report suggests is likely. Our figures are close to those of the
Trustee's Report in the early 2OlOs but thereafter until about 2040 we
derive greater annual surpluses or lower deficits than those projected in
the Trustee's Report. After 2040 we again generate higher annual deficits.
6trustees' reports,6 and we consider fixed multiples of the payroll taxes
and and the benefits currently legislated.
3. Long-Run Financial Status of OASI Under Alternative Economic
and Demographic Assumptions
Table 1 presents the results of the main simulation using the
Trustees' Report's intermediate assumptions about future economic and
demographic trends. It shows the basic trends, well known by now, that are
expected to develop in the finances of the OASI trust fund. This trust
fund will accumulate a substantial surplus over the next 25years while the
baby-boom generation is in its peak earnings years. In the following 25
years (more precisely, in the mid 2020s) when the baby-boom generation
retires, benefit payments will begin to exceed payroll-tax revenues. In
the third 25-year period there will be a still higher proportion of
retirees to workers, and annual deficits will equal a fourth of tax
receipts, or a fifth of net benefits.
For the whole 75-year period we project a deficit of nearly $500
billion in 1986 dollars discounted to 1986. This is equal to about 0.44
percent of (discounted) taxable payroll.7 Thus a rise in the Social
6. We do not consider alternative assumptions for unemployment, female labor
force participation, immigration or real interest rates.
7. This is slightly more than the 0.29 percent long-term actuarial deficit
presented in the Trustees' Report. We discussed above how the latter
figure is not very meaningful, and how a calculation comparable to ours
would yield a deficit that is lower in magnitude. A further difference is
that our calculation assumes the new, lower marginal tax rates. Under the
old tax law our simulated deficit is about 0.34 percent of taxablepayroll.
Finally, it should noted that we make no effort to calculate the future
deficit in disability insurance (DI). The Social Security Administration
7Security payroll tax rate of a little less than 0.44 percent effective now,
or substantially more later, would be needed to close the long-run OASI
trust fund deficit if the intermediate assumptions prove to be the case.
It is worth noting at this point why we present our figures in
discounted terms. First, this enables us to consider the present value
of potential futures of the OASI trust fund. This is especially
valuable as we compare scenarios with different time paths of surpluses
and deficits. Secondly, it obviates the need to give explicit
consideration to the interest received (or paid out) by the trust fund
on its calculated surplus (or deficit), if we assume that the interest
and discount rates are identical. Of course, individual participants
might value their benefits at more than the expected present value, as
they are paid as inflation-indexed life annuities. The present (1986)
value of the surplus or deficit through 2060 will equal the sum of the
present values of annual surpluses and deficits until then. As a
corollary, it becomes very simple to compute how taxes or benefits can
or must be changed to bring the trust fund into actuarial balance.
The system finances are also presented in Figure 2, where the
discounted surplus both annually and on a cumulative basis for the system
are shown. On a cumulative basis the system starts to run a deficit
(assuming the surplus accrues and real interest is 2 percent) around 2048,
and on an annual basis, around 2025. We present below some hypothetical
calculates this deficit as averaging 0.15 percent of taxable payroll, or
half as large as the OASI deficit. The Social Security Administration
total projected OASDI deficit is thus 0.44 percent of taxable payroll. The
projected deficit in Hospital Insurance is another 3.5 percent.
8scenarios of the surplus being dissipated or alternative economic and
demographic projections which alter these conclusions substantially.
The Social Security Administration's intermediate economic and
demographic assumptions are perhaps as reasonable as any, but we can be
sure that they will not be realized with great accuracy.8 It is thus
important to consider the impacts of a range of possible futures on the
Social Security system's finances.
Table 2 summarizes the effects of using the Social Security
Administration's optimistic and pessimistic assumptions for futurewage
growth, future mortality (and hence, life expectancy), future fertility and
various combinations of these parameters. Wide variations exist in
results for the financial solvency of the retirement trust fund. The
present (1986) value of the trust fund surplus (or deficit) through 2060
ranges from +$3.4 trillion to -$2.6 trillion, for the combined
optimistic and pessimistic assumptions respectively.9 We see in the
column headed "year annual deficit begins" that only when the optimistic
assumptions are combined do tax receipts exceed benefit expenditures in
each year through 2060; otherwise current-flow deficits begin between
2014 and 2030. In the next column we see that the cumulative surplus
suffices, however, to cover benefit expenditures until 2024 in the most
8. For an analysis of the inaccuracy of the economic and demographic
assumptions used in the past, see United States General Accounting Office
(1986).
9. Undiscounted, but still in 1986 dollars, the respective figures are +$14.7
trillion and -$11.1 trillion. Subsequent figures are also presented in
discounted terms. To remove discounting, multiply by 4.33.
9pessimistic scenario and beyond 2060 in several of the optimistic
scenarios.
The Social Security Administration's intermediate (Il-B) assumption
for growth in real wages, used in our base case, is that there will be an
annual gain of one and one-half percent (with some fluctuation in the very
short-run). The optimistic assumption considers a gain of two and one-half
percent annually, and the pessimistic assumption considers a gain of one
percent.
Interestingly, higher wage growth is better both for the system's
finances and for participants in the system. An increase in the trust
fund's annual surplus (taxes minus benefits) proves consistent with a
higher ratio of benefits received to taxes paid for the participants. The
reason for this is that increases in taxes, which vary with total wages,
precede the increases in benefits to which wage growth leads. The wage
index is used in the formula for determining benefits, and so a faster rise
in this index provides a higher rate of return for participants. What
"balances the books" is a growth in the unfunded liabilities of the
retirement trust fund. These liabilities could become quite burdensome if
wage growth slows in the future.
We see in Table 2 that variation in wage growth changes taxes and
benefits in the same direction, but that taxes change to a greater extent.
High wage growth increases the long-run surplus by $1.37 trillion, more than
offsetting the long-run deficit expected under the base case. Low wage
growth deepens the long-run deficit by about $450 billion.
In assumptions about mortality, what is "optimistic" for the solvency
of the retirement trust is "pessimistic" for participants, and vice versa.
The trust fund is more solvent when people die sooner and collect less in
10benefits. Table 2 shows that under the Social Security Administration's
high mortality (low life expectancy) assumption the trust fund is better
off by $963 billion over the 75-year horizon, but that under the low
mortality assumption, the system is worse off by $1.20 trillion.
Alternative assumptions about fertility matter only for those cohorts
not yet born. However, because Social Security participants beginpaying
taxes some forty years before they receive benefits, fertility rates will
have a big impact on trust fund finances in the next century)°Indeed,
today's low fertility rates are the most widely cited source of probable
future problems in Social Security finance. Currentfertility rates are
about 1.9 children per woman over her child-bearingyears. The Social
Security Administration's intermediate assumption is that this will rise
within the next two decades to 2.0 childrenper woman. The optimistic and
-- - . 11 pessimistic assumptions are 2.3 and 1.6 respectively. The results of our
simulation, shown in Table 2, are that high fertility would add $694
billion to the trust fund surplus, more than eliminating what isotherwise
a deficit, while low fertility would add $837 billion to the deficit.
Under the combined optimistic and pessimistic assumptions for trust
fund finances the differences from the intermediate scenario forlong-run
surplus are +$3.88 trillion and -$2.07 trillion (Table 3). Thepresent
10. The level of immigration, especially ofyoung people, will have an impact
for the same reason. We leave this matter for futureinvestigation.
11. In our simulation we use the Social Security Administration'sfigures for
numbers of births each calendar year, which are derived from these
fertility rates. It should be noted that the fertility rates used by the
Social Security Administration refer to the "average number of children who
would be born to a woman in her lifetime if she were to experience the
birth rates by age observed in, or assumed for, the selectedyear and if
she were to survive the entire child-bearing period."
11value of taxes differs between these extreme scenarios by a factor of
nearly two, while benefits vary by a factor of about 1.3.
Figure 3 shows how the size of the accumulated trust fund varies over
the next 75 years for the overall optimistic, intermediate (base case), and
pessimistic scenarios. Note that the continuing increase in the trust fund
occurs only when all of the optimistic assumptions occur simultaneously.
For any one of the optimistic assumptions alone, interest on the trust fund
is eventually insufficient to cover the difference between current benefits
and current taxes, and the principal itself is exhausted before 2090 (Table
3, last column).
4. Financial Impact of Alternative Uses of the Potential OASDI Trust Fund
Surplus
We noted in the previous section that only under the combined
optimistic assumptions for wage growth, mortality and fertility can we
hope that the retirement trust fund will take in at least as much each
year in taxes as it pays out in benefits. In all other cases an
accumulation in the trust fund is necessary in order to forestall the
time when taxes must be raised or benefits reduced.12 Under intermediate
assumptions, for example, an annual deficit will begin in 2025 but the
accumulated surplus will keep the trust fund solvent until 2048.
12. Of course, the consumption of the economy as a whole is limited by what is
produced by those still working. Thus, in some sense Social Security
benefits must always be funded at the time they are paid. Still, the
method of financing Social Security determines who has what claims, and
this has important implications both for equity and efficiency.
12It has always proved difficult to accumulate a large trust fund
surplus. It is in the interest. of each session of Congrsss, andeach
administration, to raise benefits (or perhaps to lower taxes, although that
has not yet been tried) if possible. Raising benefitsconveys transfers to
those receiving, or soon to receive, benefits while imposing much of the
cost of the action on future generations which do not vote yet. Lowering
taxes, similarly, helps a current generation of workers while requiring
higher taxes from future generations than would otherwise benecessary.
The situation is now particularly acute for a major demographic
reason: in less than 30 years the baby-boom generation will begin to
retire. If we do not accumulate a trust fund surplus before then,
future adjustments in payroll tax rates or in benefits will have to be
much greater than would otherwise be necessary.
Figure 4 depicts the combined (employer and employee) tax rates which
would be required each year to fund currently-legislated benefits(given
intermediate assumptions) without adding to or drawingupon an accumulated
surplus. Until 202513 tax rates could be lower than those currently
legislated, but thereafter they would rise drastically.
Conversely, Figure 5 shows the level of benefits which could be funded
by each year's tax receipts. This level is presented in the form of a
ratio to benefits as provided for under current legislation. We see that
benefits could be raised intermittently through 2009, to a level 30percent
13. The higher tax rate shown for 2022 is a quirk resulting from theway our
simulation handles the rise in retirement age, from 66 to 67, which occurs
around that time. We simulate the change as occurring all at once rather
than phased in over several years.
13higher than that now legislated, but that thereafter they must either
decline or, perhaps more plausible politically, be maintained through
increases in payroll tax rates. The tax rates required to finance these
increased benefits are depicted in the broken line of Figure 4.
Table 3 summarizes the financial impacts of several ways of
dissipating the trust fund surplus which is projected to grow over the next
35 to 40 years. "Pay-as-you-go tax rates" considers the scenario in which,
beginning in 1990, tax rates are set each year at a level which exactly
covers that year's benefit payments. Similarly, "pay-as-you-go benefits"
considers, also for 1990 on, the adjustment of benefit levels to match
projected tax receipts. The tax rates and benefit levels of these
scenarios thus follow the heavy lines depicted in Figures 4 and 5
respectively.
The "benefit ratchet" scenarios consider the cases in which benefits
rise to their pay-as-you-go peak in 2009 but do not subsequently decline.
The first of these scenarios notes the enormous deficit ($3.69 trillion)
generated when the higher benefit level is not funded with taxes, while the
second considers the case of taxes rising, in a pay-as-you-go fashion, to
fund the increased benefits.
The last two of these scenarios consider what will happen if the
surplus which would accumulate over the next forty years is dissipated, or
directed to other purposes. Two very plausible possibilities for this are
that the surplus could be used to cover some of the massive deficit in
Social Security's Hospital Insurance fund which (absent a major reform) will
develop within a few years,14 or that the surplus will, in the face of
14federal budget deficits, be used to fund other expenditures. The firstof
these scenarios raises taxes in apay-as-you-go fashion from 2025 on: Thus
these scenarios are equivalent to the earlierpay-as-you-go scenarios from
2025 on; they only lack the period in which tax or else benefit levelsare
more favorable for participants than the levels currently legislated. The
chief result for system finances (Table 3) under all these scenarios--
except,of course, the unfunded ratcheting of benefits -- isthat the long-
run surplus is, by construction, essentially zero.
5.Projections of Net National Saving and Its Components Under
Alternative Hypothetical Scenarios
We turn now to estimates of net national saving and itscomponents
under alternative hypothetical scenariosconcerning the future of Social
Security financing and various other factors. Before turning to the
results, we reiterate that these are meant only to be simple simulations
designed to highlight some emerging national policy issues.They are not
meant to be taken as a thorough analysis of the likely evolution ofany of
the components, let alone all of them. Nor dothey exhaust the various
interesting alternative scenarios. In these calculations, we use the SSA
projections, which differ slightly for OASI from my own, as discussed
above.
14. In practice, it is more likely that a portion of OASDI'spayroll tax will be
reallocated to HI. The analysis of OASI finances would then be similarto
that of the pay-as-you-go tax rate scenario.
15Note that net national saving, which we label total saving, TS, is the
sumofprivate saving, PS (gross private saving, net of depreciation, the
sumofpersonal and business saving), state and local government saving,
SLS (traditionally measured by the state and local surplus, although the
simultaneously accruing liabilities in the pension funds are not properly
accounted for nor is net state and local capital formation), and federal
government saving, FS (traditionally measured by the federal government
surplus, although the simultaneously accruing future pension liabilities




We decompose the federal government surplus, FS, into the federal
surplus excluding Social Security, FSXS, and the OASDI surplus and HI
surplus. Thus,
(2) FS =FSXS+OASDIS+HIS.
Before turning to the basic simulation results, it is worth
anticipating the discussion in the next section concerning the importance
of net national saving for investment and international capital flows by
recalling from the national income identity that
15. See Boskin, Robinson and Huber (1987) for a discussion of federal, state
and local government saving when account is taken of capital formation, as
well as a number of other factors.
16(3) FS =I-PS-SLS+NFl,
where I is domestic investment and NFl is net foreign investment. Holding
national income constant, changes in FS must be matched by corresponding
changes in PS, I, SLS, and/or NFl. Once we establish the likely effects on
national saving in this section, we will discuss the implications for
investment and net foreign investment in the next section.
We start out with some particular ttbase case" assumptions. For
simplicity, we assume in most, but not all, of the calculations that the
net private saving rate is constant at 6% of GNP, close to its historical
average. We discuss below cases in which "Denison's Law" holds, in which
the gross private saving rate is constant. In that case, the growth of the
capital consumption allowance will decrease net private saving. We also
discuss a simple conservative calculation of the impact of changing
demography on the saving rate through time. But in the remaining cases,
the net private saving rate is assumed constant at 6%. The state and local
surplus, according to the Commerce Department, has been abnormally high for
the last several years, in part due to funding issues in their pension
systems. It is presumed to run 1% of GNP for the next five years, then to
decline for the following ten years, until it reaches budget balance and
remains there from the turn of the century onward. This leaves us with
federal government saving, the non-Social Security surplus or deficit, and
the OASDI and HI surplus or deficit. We consider several alternatives for
the non-Social Security deficit. In the base case, we have the non-Social
Security deficit evolve to keep the national debt/GNP ratio constant at
current levels. Holding constant the ratio of national debt to CNP, we
ignore except in one scenario where we explicitly model a balanced primary
17budget, the distinction between the primary budget deficit and interest
payments.
We consider various alternative scenarios or rules with respect to the
remainder of the budget, either explicitly or implicitly, via rules on the
overall budget. For example, we examine net national saving under Graimn-
Rudnian with and without HI balanced, a balanced budget from the year 2000
onward, continuing federal government deficits, the optimistic and
pessimistic SSA assumptions, a zero primary deficit, pay-as-you-go OASDI,
and benefits ratcheting up in the era of the OASDI surplus.
The results of the simulation are portrayed in Figures 6 -18.Net
national saving and its components are plotted for the 75 year projection
period usually employed by the Social Security Administration, in this
case, 1986 to 2060. A variety of interesting features emerges from these
graphs. For example, consider Figures 6 and 7 which estimate net national
saving under Granun-Rudman plus the remaining assumptions described above.
The net national saving rate rises abruptly from its current 2% to about 7%
by 1991, due largely to the substantial decrease in the federal government
budget deficit. It then gradually declines to 6% around the turn of the
century for about a decade, then declines sharply to under 4% after 2026.
Importantly, the comparison of Figures 6 and 7 reveals that by moving HI
into budget balance we would raise the net national saving rate by about
two percentage points in the period after the turn of the century. We do
not discuss here what combination of tax increase and/or benefit reduction
is used to balance HI; it is assumed that it occurs in a manner that does
not affect the other components.
Figure 8 presents net national saving under a balanced federal budget
for the year 2000 and thereafter. This might be thought of as simulating a
strict balance budget requirement, such as that advocated by a
18constitutional amendment.As can be seen, net national saving rises
substantially, then gradually falls, reflecting the surplus turning to
deficit in OASDI and the HI deficit. The budget is required to be in
balance for the non-Social Security part of the budget.
In what might be thought of as a base case, with the debt/GNP ratio
(excluding Social Security) held constant, Figures 9 and 10 project net
national saving with federal and OASDI deficits, and correspondingly, with
HI in budget balance. The net national saving rate falls precipitously,
beginning about the year 2005, and in the base case, falls to under 1% of
GNP by the year 2030. HI budget balance, as can be seen, adds the usual
couple of percentage points to the net national saving rate early in the
next century.
Figures 11 and 12 use the base case assumptions for PS and SLS, but
replace the intermediate SSA assumptions by the optimistic and pessimistic
ones, respectively. They also allow the non-Social Security budget deficit
to evolve based on the alternative assumptions on GNP growth, etc. Net
national saving is substantially higher under the optimistic Social
Security assumptions, as the status of the OASDI fund and HI fund improve
enormously, as does, to a lesser extent, the non-Social Security deficit.
In fact, net national saving not only declines much less to slightly under
4% in the peak of the baby-boom's retirement, but begins to rise above 4%
later on. Under the pessimistic assumptions, as expected, net national
saving takes a nose dive, turning negative about 2015. This is due to the
very large deficits in HI, cumulating by then, and the fact that OASDI will
have turned to deficit about five years earlier, thereby offsetting all of
private saving.
Figure 13 portrays net national saving under a zero primary deficit,
19i.e., the federal budget net of interest payments. As can be seen, net
national saving falls, but remains positive, if paltry, by the first
quarter of the next century.
Figures 14 -16highlight some potential reactions to the building of
the OASDI surplus. Figure 14 portrays net national saving and its
components under pay-as-you-go OASDI, assuming either the tax increase to
finance deficits, and the benefit decreases during the period of OASDI
surpluses do not affect the other components of net national saving.
Dissipating the early surplus, compared to the base case, lowers net
national saving substantially in the first three decades of the projection.
Net national saving falls to 3% by the turn of the century, and eventually
declines still further to about 2% of GNP. Note, however, that net
national saving under pay-as-you-go OASDI, while substantially lower for
the next thirty years or so, eventually is higher, partially offsetting
base case projections of subsequent large OASDI surplus.
Figure 15 presents net national saving under the alternative described
in detail in Section 4 concerning the possibility of benefits ratchetingup
during the period of the OASDI surplus and remaining at those higher levels
thereafter. Net national saving plunmiets as in the previous case for the
next thirty years, and then declines precipitously, becoming negative about
2016, and falling to -5% of CNP by about 2030. Undoubtedly, well before
such a national catastrophe occurred, various alternative policies would be
adopted. This is the flip side of the $3.7 trillion deficit estimated for
this case in Section 4. Note that were we to add a tax increase and/or
benefit cuts in the HI system to this case, that net national saving would
rise about 2 percentage points, as seen in Figure 16.
Figures 17 and 18 estimate the impact of dissipation of the OASDI
surplus (assuming HI is balanced) by using it to finance the general
20federal deficit and to increase spending, respectively. The impact of the
dissipation of the surplus, and how the funds are used, is substantial.
Finally, we present in Figures 19 and 20 two simplistic scenarios
where the private saving rate varies: First, because of changes in theage
structure of the population and second because of the alleged constancy of
the gross private saving rate, "Denison's Law". In Figure 19, we have
allowed the net private saving rate to vary with the age structure. We use
SSA projections of the fractions of the population in the three age
cohorts, 20-44, 45-64, and 65-and-over, in the future, assume that the
relative incomes per household of the three groups remain as estimated in
1984 (see Boskin, Kotlikoff and Knetter (1985)), and, for simplicity, that
the saving rate of people in their peak earning years is twice that of
younger workers, whereas the saving rate of the elderly is -3%. The rates
are calibrated so that the overall rate in 1984 is 6%. There is
substantial controversy concerning whether the elderly save or dissave
during retirement, at what rate, and the implications this may have for a
number of important aspects of saving behavior. We remain agnostic on this
issue in this particular paper, and merely present this as one hypothetical
situation which might result in saving rates changing. As can be seen in
Figure 19, however, the saving rate merely varies from 5.8% to 6.2%. We
would need either a much more dramatic change in the relative incomes or a
substantially greater variation in the saving rates by age for large
variations in the private saving rate to occur. Of course, this is
possible if the elderly do dissave and/or if relative incomes change so as
to change dramatically the relative income weighting underlying Figure 19.
In any event, relative to the base case, the variations are quite modest.
Not so modest are the implications of "Denison's Law", which asserts
21that the gross private saving rate is constant. Ignoring any feedback from
changes in the net saving rate to the rate of investment, capital
formation, and depreciation, we simulate a simple scenario in which the
capital formation process in the economy results in a gradual rise in the
capital consumption allowance over the next forty years. We presume this
rise is about 2 percentage points. Clearly with the gross private saving
rate constant, the net private saving rate must decline by two percentage
points in this case. Under the other assumptions of the base case
scenario, net national saving, as depicted in Figure 20, declines by 2
percentage points, holding all of the other components constant. In this
case, national saving turns negative by 2016, as it falls continuously from
1991 on, the year in which we begin the simulation of the gradual rise in
the capital consumption allowance. There is no particular reason other
than simplicity why we have chosen this form, nor would we expect the
capital consumption allowance necessarily to move at this rate or to remain
constant after 2020; we present these results because of the strong belief
held by some in "Denison's Law".
Tables 4, 5 and 6 highlight some of the important results on the
effects of Social Security on national saving. Table 4 projects net
national saving and its components as a percentage of GNP for the 75 year
period and for each of the usual 25 year sub-periods for the base case with
and without HI balanced. As can be seen, the total national saving rate is
a little over 2% for the entire period in the base case, and 3.33% when HI
is balanced. These 75 year averages are composed of a small OASDI deficit,
a federal deficit of 2.33% of GNP, a very small state and local surplus, a
constant 6% private saving rate, and the HI deficit in the base case and HI
budget balance from 1991 in the second case. The three sub-periods show
interesting variations. The net national saving rate is substantially
22higher in the first 25 year period, averaging slightly over 4%. In the
second period, the net national saving rate falls to 1.7% and 3.1%
respectively. In the third 25 year period, the corresponding net national
saving rates are 0.5% and 2.8%. Given the other assumptions, the primary
difference revolves around the OASDI and HI surplus/deficit pattern.
Table 5 presents estimates of net national saving averaged over each
of the three twenty-five periods and the entire seventy-fiveyear period
for various alternative future financing scenarios. It reveals the
substantial impact alternative Social Security financing alternativesmay
have on net national saving. For example, consider the period 1986-2010.
Moving from the base case with accumulation of the OASDI surplus topay-as-
you-go OASDI (i.e., tax rate cuts to match outlays) reduces net national
saving by 20%, from 4.0% to 3.2.% of CNP. Still more dramatic changes
occur with other financing scenarios and in the later periods.
Table 6 presents an alternative method of viewing howquantitatively
important the Social Security surplus or deficit will be as a percentage of
other net national saving over the 75 year horizon and in each of the 25
year periods. For the base case, over the 75 year horizon, the Social
Security deficit, including the HI deficit offsets 38% of all other net
national saving. This decomposes into, adding 17% in the first 25years,
offsetting almost one-half in the second 25 years, and over four-fifths,
in the third 25 year period. In the case where HI is balanced, by whatever
combination of tax increases and benefit reductions, Social Security
offsets substantially less of other net national saving. The Gramm-Rudman
cases demonstrate substantially higher other net national saving, and
therefore, the Social Security surplus or deficit offsetting a more modest
fraction of net national saving. The other cases indicate just how much
23may be at stake in net national saving in alternative future Social
Security financing policies. For example, in the case where benefits rise
during the years which otherwise would have had a surplus, and then remain
elevated, over three-fourths of all other net national saving will be
offset by the OASDI deficit, starting with a small offset the first 25
years and then offsetting all other saving. Clearly, in such a case,
there would undoubtedly be some adjustment in taxes and/or the remainder of
the budget to compensate.
We have outlined the results nGt just to present an array of
alternative potential scenarios nor to present estimates of net national
saving which should be viewed in any way other than hypothetical, but to
highlight how important the direct effects of Social Security can be on net
national saving. That effect clearly can be enormous in any year, in each
of the twenty-five subperiods considered, as well as in the 75 year
projection period of the SSA. Assumptions concerning the other components
of net national saving will affect the level of net national saving but
still leave the situation where the status of the future financing of OASDI
will have an enormous direct impact on net national saving in the United
States. Of couse, the direct impact may be offset or accentuated by the
impact of OASDI on private saving and/or other components of government
saving and borrowing.
6. Implications For Investment, International Capital Flows, Trade,
Productivity Growth
The results reported above were designed to highlight the potentially
significant impact that alternative policy options with respect to
accumulation or dissipation of the OASDI surplus will have on the net
24national saving rate. Net national saving is important for a variety of
reasons. Saving is the method by which individual households transfer
resources from one part of their lifetime to another, e.g., from their peak
earnings years to retirement. Government sector saving or borrowing, among
other things, is the method by which the public sector attempts to transfer
resources, at least tax burdens, intertemporally. More directly, net
national saving is available to finance domestic investment or net foreign
investment. A higher net national saving rate may help increase the level
of domestic capital formation, or decrease the need for imports of foreign
capital. The simplistic analyses we usually teach our graduate students
suggest that a high rate of capital formation will temporarily increase the
rate of economic growth and will lead permanently to a higher level of
income by making labor more productive due to the higher capital labor
ratio. In a closed economy, a higher saving rate will be invested in the
long-run. In an open economy, a higher saving rate will increase U.S.
capital flows abroad and/or decrease foreign capital flows into the United
States. As discussed above, in recent years, the United States has been a
substantial importer of foreign capital. These imports have become
significant enough to make the U.S. a net debtor, at least if the books are
taken at face value (U.S. assets overseas are usually treated at historic
cost). Thus, each year the United States imports large amounts of foreign
capital, despite the short-run benefits, results in an annual stream of
claims against that investment in the future as interest, dividends and
rents to foreigners. Ultimately, the only way to pay those returns is for
the United States to export more than it imports. For example, in 1986 the
United States imported $144 billion of net capital from abroad. For
simplicity, if we assume a return of 10 percent, this would commit the
25United States to an increase of net exports of $14 billion a year.
Thus, a low net national saving rate will either be matched by a low
domestic rate of capital formation or if investment in the United States
exceeds net national saving, continued foreign capital inflows into the
United States.
The extent to which the United States must ultimately finance its
domestic capital formation from its ownsavingis uncertain. While recent
declines in net national saving have been substantially offset by importing
foreign capital, there is no convincing example in economic history of an
advanced economy financing its long-term development by continuing to rely
on foreign capital to finance its investment. The success stories of
external finance assisted growth have been of less developed countries,
whether recently or historically, such as the U.S. and Canada in the 19th
Century. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Summers (1986) present evidence
which suggests that domestic investment at least in the long-run must be
financed by domestic saving. While the subject is far from closed, no one
can be sure how long foreign investors will be willing to pour several
percent of GNP into the United States annually.Eventually foreign
portfolios will become less and less diversified as the share of their
assets in dollar-denominated securities grows to significant proportions.
They would thus demand higher returns to compensate for this increased
risk.
Even if we conclude that in the long-run domestic capital formation
must be financed by national saving, the contribution of capital formation
to economic growth with respect to the magnitude and time frame is a source
of some controversy. Recent studies, for example, by Denison (1985) and
Jorgenson, Fraumeni, and Gallop (1987), come to quite different conclusions
with respect to the quantitative significance of capital formation in post-
26war economic growth and in the productivity slowdown of the 1970s.
While no precise quantitative estimate can be given detailing the
impact of changes in the rate of net national saving upon domestic capital
formation and international capital flows, and correspondingly on
productivity growth and/or future trade patterns, the qualitative patterns
are clear, and the quantitative impact is likely to be important: low
rates of net national saving are likely to lead to low rates of domestic
investment in the long-run and substantial international capital flows into
the United States in the short-run. Thus, the policy options withrespect
to Social Security have substantial ramifications for the future
performance of the economy well beyond the importance that they rightfully
deserve in terms of the retirement income security of current and future
retired persons.
7.Conclusion
This paper has documented how the systematic deviation frompay-as-
you-go finance of the Social Security system is planned to result in
signficant surpluses for the next several decades in OASDI. Subsequently,
OASDI will run large deficits. HI is projected to run large and growing
deficits beginning in the 1990s.
Unless offset by changes in private saving or non-Social Security
budget deficits, these deviations from pay-as-you-go finance will cause
substantial systematic swings in the net national saving rate. Alternative
scenarios with respect to the disposition of the OASDI surplus over the
next three decades lead to important changes in the net national saving
rate. These swings are likely to be significant enough to cause
27quantitatively important changes in the level of domestic investment which
can be financed internally and/or the patterns of net foreign investment.
Thus, future trade patterns and productivity growth will be affected,
perhaps substantially.
The paper thus highlights the important role Social Security's future
financing patterns will have on the course of the economy quite independent
of whether or not they affect private saving behavior. The potential
interaction of Social Security and private saving, and the potential
interaction of the state of the Social Security surplus (or perhaps more
accurately, its expected state) and the federal government's deficit in the
remainder of the budget will be important as well. The paper has
demonstrated the substantial reduction in the net national saving rate
which will occur if the OASDI surplus of the next three decades does not
accrue and is used instead to raise benefits, reduce taxes, or fund other
government programs (the most likely candidate being the HI deficit). The
likely response of private saving to the various alternative scenarios is a
source of controversy, partly because there is a major debate concerning
the methods by which the Social Security system may affect private saving, as
well as concerns about the quantitative magnitudes of any impact that may
have occurred historically. Changing demography, patterns of risk and
risk-bearing in the economy, household formation and dissolution, and
perceptions of the risks involved in "Social Security wealth" as opposed to
other types of assets may also make extrapolations from earlier studies
somewhat hazardous (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for some interesting
simulation results with respect to changes in demography).
However, it might generally be thought that if Social Security OASDI
surpluses are used to raise benefits substantially, this may well lead to a
decrease in saving for those then in their peak earning years, who expect
28to receive higher benefits without having to pay higher taxes subsequently
(netting out any private intrafamily intergenerational transfers offsetting
this effect, assuming that they are far less than dollar for dollar).
Other methods of dissipating the surplus would have analogous results,
depending upon the time pattern of changes in expected benefits and taxes
for persons of various ages. There is also the important fact that the
growth of Social Security, changing demography and changes in financial
markets, along with the deviations from pay-as-you-go finance, alter the
perceived risk attached to any potential claims to future Social Security
benefits. For example, well-off current prime age earners may believe that
Social Security will be means-tested at an income level below their
expected other resources when they reach old age in order to finance any
deficits that result. One might expect these perceived risks also to
affect private saving behavior.
Of course, changes in net national saving may directly affect interest
rates which may in turn affect desired private saving, contributions to
defined benefit pension plans, the valuation of existing stocks of wealth,
etc. While the short-run openness of the economy to international flows of
capital might be expected to mitigate any effect on interest rates, all of
the advanced economies will be aging rapidly and may experience reductions
in private saving and pressure on their public budgets.
Finally, there is an additional important channel by which private
saving behavior may be altered. In response to the pressures involved in
financing future Social Security benefits for the baby-boom generation, it
may well be that the remainder of the federal budget and/or public policy
with respect to private saving, such as rules governing pension plans, the
taxation of saving, etc., may respond in an attempt to encourage private
29saving. Of course, the extent to which they would be successful in doing
so raises a host of other questions to which only imprecise answers can be
given.
In conclusion, this paper should be viewed as highlighting the
important role that Social Security's future financing pattern may have on
net national saving, directly through the accumulation of a surplus and
subsequent larger deficit, and indirectly through the potential interaction
of Social Security and private saving, and the potential interaction of the
state of the Social Security system's finances and the federal government's
deficit in the remainder of the budget. The numerous caveats concerning
the direct calculation discussed above, as well as the issues concerning
the response of private saving, should be borne in mind in interpreting the
results.
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Base Case (Intermediate Assumption)
A. FINANCIAL FLOWS OF OASI TRUST FUND
1986$BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
TIME PERIOD PAYROLL TAXES BENEFITSBEN TAXESa
SURPLUS /
SURPLUS PAYROLL
1986TO2010 39584 4366 3997114(141) 483 1.22%
2011TO2035 38540 4232 4422158(198) -31 -0.08%
2036TO2060 34460 3784 4925196(244) -946 -2.74%






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Projected Net National Saving & Its Components
As A Percentage of Projected ON?































































N.B. Data are simple averages of annual total.Table 5
Projected Net National Saving
As a Percentage of Projected GNP






Base Case, HI Balanced
Optimistic SSA Assumptions
Pessimistic SSA Assumptions






































































-2.4 3.2 -1.0Table 6
Percentage Change In Net National Saving Due to Social Security Surplus
or Deficit, By Period, For Alternative Financing Scenarios
Scenario
j
1986-2060 1986-2010 2011-2035 2036-2060
Gramm-Rudman -21.4 11.3 -27.8 -47.6
Granini-Rudman(HI balanced) -1.0 18.8 -5.4 -16.3
lanced Federal Budget
(2000 and after)
-20.5 14.0 -27.8 -47.6
Base Case -38.0 17.0 -47.0 -82.0
Base Case, HI Balanced -3.7 26.8 -9.9 -28.1
Optimistic SSA Assumptions 20.7 37.2 16.0 8.9
Pessimistic SSA Assumptions -137.9 -10.8 -41.7 -71.4
Zero "Primary" Fed. Deficit -32.7 15.0 -151.9 -251.0
Pay-As-You-Go OASDI -32.4 -5.2 -38.1 -53.9
OASDI Benefit Ratchet -77.5 -6.4 -94.6 -131.4
OASDI Benefit Ratchet,
HI Balanced
-43.5 3.4 -56.6 77.4
OASDI Surplus Finances Fed.
Deficit, HI Balanced
-3.7 26.8 -9.9 -28.1
OASDI Surplus Spent,
HI Balanced
-12.9 3.9 -14.5 -28.1











N.B. Data are simple averages of annual total.S
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